


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MR. KIRKPATRICK'S GRADUATION ADDRESS TO OFC #21



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I look upon these talks as an opportunity to more or less review where we stand as an intelligence organization and where the effort of the United States in the intelligence field rests and to reflect exactly as to what it means to us as the professional officers in the Central Intelligence Agency. I think those of you that are about to complete this Operations Familiarization Course may look on this as somewhat of a commencement aftermath and a prelude to probably no more training for quite a few years because I'm assured that your bosses will find it always impossible to spare you for additional training despite what the necessities may be.

I don't know whether you had an opportunity to hear President Kennedy when he spoke at 2 o'clock today to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. As you know, the situation in Cuba this last week has been extremely active. A rebel group landed and, unhappily, was probably quite completely wiped out except for those that could escape into the Escambray Mountains. I might add that the Intelligence Community doesn't know a lot more than the newspapers and that both our reports as well as the press reports contain a great deal of speculation and, we know, a

great deal of inaccurate information. But it's sufficiently accurate to know a couple of things and to these the President alluded in his speech. You'll recall, if you did hear it, that at the end he made the comment that we should recognize that despite the degree that we had developed our armed forces, despite the number of missiles that we might have, that it was still possible for the Communists (I don't believe he used that particular word), but it was still possible for us to lose the struggle that was going on without ever using the armed forces or using the missiles, and that he intended to have a complete realignment of our resources in order that we might cope with this struggle. It's much too early of course to do a post mortem on what happened in Cuba. We can hope and pray that there is still some resistance element left there and that perhaps this might crystalize and develop into something more serious, but I don't think we'd be very practical, either as intelligence officers, and that we'd probably be engaging in wishful thinking if we thought that it was ever going to be strong enough in the foreseeable future to overthrow Castro. So I would like to start with a brief personal analysis; not official, but personal analysis of what I feel has happened in Cuba and the lessons we can learn from it as intelligence officers because I think here on our southern doorstep we have an almost exact reflection of what is happening in many areas of the world and particularly all of the underdeveloped areas of the world, and I must say that I'm not very optimistic about the future of the particular struggle we're engaged in unless we start moving much faster and in much greater strength than we have in the past.

I think we must dismiss lessons of Guatemala and Iran as being in the early stages of this struggle when the opposition wasn't very fast or very adept and realize that we have got to really get into this in great strength in the future. We have got to stop playing by the Marquis of Kingsbury rules or any system like that. If we're going to take our gloves off, let's take them off and get into the fight.

Now, I did visit Cuba on three occasions; in 1956, 57 and 58. Peculiarly enough I did not visit there after the first of January 1959. Now, during this period - 56, 57 and 58, as you know, Batista was in power, and we had what has been described as a dictatorship. On the other hand, Cuba was very wealthy, the rich were getting richer and, unhappily, the poor were getting poorer. It was not an enlightened dictatorship in any sense of the word. Where Batista put the money that he got legally or illegally was into those things that are obvious, such as better roads - I think he did build a few schools. He didn't do much to help the peasants, the sugar workers, and the others which are the great majority of the Cuban people. His administration was just about as corrupt as it could come. It was ruthless. It was coldblooded. It was just as bad in its way as the Soviet administration is in its.

There are, of course, two strong elements in the United States - those that feel that we should have kept Batista in power because he was a friend of the United States and because everything was calm and then, on the other extreme, those who felt that this was a dictatorship and *per se*, all dictatorships are bad. And, then you had those say enlightened

liberals, who realized that you cannot keep a futile system in modern society, particularly when the Communists are striving their best to change it all over the world.

We have been blamed in the press and in the Congress for not having anticipated the degree of Communist infiltration in the 26th of July movement - the Castro movement. I think this is a correct criticism - I don't think we did know as accurately as perhaps we should have as to the degree of infiltration. On the other hand, perhaps in self-justification, I would point out that Castro's 26th of July movement had a great number of non-Communists; in fact, the greatest number in the movement were non-Communist. It's quite true in looking at it in retrospect that there were an awful lot of Communists in it too, and where we probably missed was not having identified and pointed out the Communist activists that were the real core of what was going to happen later. You may also recall that the cabinet that Castro first appointed in January of 1959 was, and I heard it described by our own esteemed Department of State, the finest cabinet in the history of Cuba. This meant that he had enlisted some very distinguished Cubans to serve in the Cuban cabinet. Well, the rest of the history is fairly public. The Communists moved exceedingly fast in taking over, and only this week did we learn how thoroughly they had moved in taking over and in mobilizing and developing a militia and an armed force which was far beyond any capacity that Washington had estimated as of this month. I have heard the descriptions of the Cuban militia and the Cuban army in recent weeks and it is quite true that a great deal of the hope for this rebel group that went in to Cochinas Bay was based

upon the fact that there would be large scale defections from the militia that would be as badly a fighting force as Batista's army was, and there couldn't have been much worse than that, and that, as a consequence, it would all crystalize around the rebels - there would be an uprising in Havana - they would move in and this Communist government would go. Unhappily we saw just the opposite. We have no evidence that there were any defections on any scale, large or small, from the militia. They were not a poorly trained, ill fighting group. They were apparently an extremely well fighting group. They fought with tanks and artillery and aircraft. They were well organized, well mobilized, and, despite the fact that the rebels group was apparently well trained and well equipped, they pretty thoroughly wiped them out in less than 48 hours.

The point here that I think is vital to us to understand and to understand quite thoroughly in the Intelligence Community, is first, the speed with which the Communists can get a country organized once they have been in power. January 1, 1959 - April 15, 1961, and they're strong enough to defeat something which we never would have conceived before and could have been defeated in such a short time. Their militia, as you know, numbers about 400,000, making it by far the largest force in the Western Hemisphere outside of the United States, and it's not an inconsequential force to be dismissed. Furthermore, I think there was a total underestimation in the Intelligence Community of the fact that the ones that disliked Castro were the middle class and the upper class - the professional groups. And the ones that are apparently still very solidly behind Castro are the peasants and the ones that have less income and have something to thank Castro for because they had nothing before the time he came in and they have something

today. Now, this I think we're going to see followed in every under-developed country of the world unless we do something about it. I don't think we're going to find success simply by arming a group or putting a strong man in power or pumping economic aid into a country and having it flow out exactly like water over the top of a bucket as we did in Laos, because this is not going to be the way that we're going to win this cold war. Further, I think that looking at it very specifically from the point of view of the intelligence system and the intelligence organization - not only from strictly the point of view of intelligence per se, but also from the point of view of the cold war operations, covert action - we must recognize that this is going to be a ruthless struggle. It's going to require far greater assets than the United States Government at this moment is putting into the effort and it's going to require a very close collaboration and effort between the Central Intelligence Agency, the three military services, the Department of State, and, of course, wherever it involves internal matters, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

As I see the future of the picture today, and as I said at the start, I'm very pessimistic about this situation - Laos is gone. I don't think there's a chance of the proverbial snowball of saving Laos as it stands today. The last map I saw in Washington of the Communist controlled areas showed that they were almost all the way over to the Mekong River, almost straight up and down the country. They practically cut the country at Thakhek in the South. They're close to Vientiane within about 20 miles from the North. They're close to the traditional Capitol of the Kings at

Luang Prabang and it looks like Laos is gone. I didn't get to Laos on a trip to Southeast Asia last year. The trip was cut off for other reasons. But I did get to Viet Nam and I regret to say that I'm not very optimistic about that situation. Here again, unhappily, we were fighting, if you will, World War II, and the Communists were fighting World War III.

We had had a military aid group that had done a magnificent job in organizing the South Viet Nameese Army to fight a war along traditional American lines - like Gettysberg, or Chateau Thierry, or the Battle of the Bulge, or something like that. But the Communists don't want to fight that type of battle. They're going to fight hit and run, ill-infiltration, assassination, terrorism, until they tear the moral fibre of the country apart and until it falls into their hands like a ripe apple. And we're not going to succeed by sending in U.S. troops to help because it will be too late by the time that decision is made, and besides the Communists may well elect to fight in Laos as they did in Korea - I mean in South Viet Nam as they did in Korea. I can cite just a couple of statistics to describe the situation in South Viet Nam and I'd simply say that it's worse today than it was when I was there last June. At that time there were 200 South Viet Nameese officials assassinated every month in the area south of Saigon by Communist terrorists. You know, this can be very debilitating to any career service and I think it was no less so out there, and the Communists, since that time, have moved in closer and closer and I understand that Viet Cong is now operating right in the outskirts of Saigon and that the curfew there is exceedingly strict, and, as you know, just within the past couple of weeks there have been a couple Americans wounded by hand grenades.

So here is another area of the world that is going - or may well be too late to save. I hope we can save South Viet Nam because it's a pretty key area. These are just two of the critical areas of the world. You can mention almost any one of the new republics in Africa and they're going to be areas for major struggles. Now one of the sad parts that we should note here is that this should not come as news in the Intelligence Community or to the people in Washington. These situations have been deteriorating over a period of years. They didn't happen over night - the Communists work isn't done over night - but they have long term planning, something which I have yet to see in Washington, D.C. and particularly in the United States Intelligence Community.

Our planning is almost on a day to day basis, slightly longer, our estimating system now projects five years ahead, but there's great criticism in the Intelligence Community that it isn't looking ten years ahead and when you take this in consideration with the fact that our budget cycle requires a minimum of two years, (and I'm talking now exclusively of the budget cycle) between the time that we start figuring out what we're going to need to spend, and the time that it's actually spent - and if you add to that the lead time required for the production of modern weapons, you simply know that you've got to estimate a little further than five years in advance to get an intelligence admixture of our arms, or even of the forces we need. And I would simply note this in passing - that every year we have this - you'll excuse the expression - stupid feud that's carried on in public in front of the armed services committees by the respective

services as to how many missiles we should have, how many heavy bombers we should have, how many nautilus submarines we should have, and whether we should have an Army that's prepared for nuclear warfare or for what they call brush fires, and whether it should be composed of 20 divisions, 19 divisions, 14 divisions, or whatever it may be. The fact seems to be that either the planners and the policymakers and the Chiefs of Staff don't read the intelligence estimates or don't hear what's said in the Intelligence Community because they certainly should have stopped long since trying to prepare for a general war when it seems fairly obvious that the Communists have absolutely no intention today of fighting for a general war. I would simply add here that I would not like to see us lower our guards sufficiently so that they'd suddenly switch and elect a general war because I think this is very basic. I think this is something we must realize - that the Kremlin can move exceedingly fast and it can change policy in a matter of minutes, whereas it may take us quite a bit of reaction time before we switch our policy. So I think here the thing that's essential is that we keep our guard up and that is in the nature of being prepared to fight a general war if the Communists should elect that, but that we should mobilize right now for the war of subversion, which I believe is going to be the war that will be fought over the next decade or two, and it will be fought at least until the time that we have convinced the Communists that they cannot subvert the free world, even though they may succeed in subverting some of the underdeveloped countries initially, and that ultimately they must either resort to force to conquer us or they in turn might suddenly change their system of government. I

don't think ever we should forget as intelligence officers that we must anticipate anything and everything because we're up against one of the cleverest and probably most sinister components in the history of our nation and they, as I have said, will use any weapon they can to achieve the world mastery, which international Communism continually repeats as its ultimate objective. So much for the world situation, now let's take a look at what we're doing about it and how the United States Intelligence Community stands today.


I think the initial thing that should be said about our effort in the field of intelligence is that it is not a small effort. I can't use the precise figures that we have in the way of manpower or in the way of money that's being used; first, because I don't know them. I tried for six months to find out but was unable to find out because the United States Intelligence Community doesn't know itself how many men and women there are working in intelligence, even as staff officers, let alone as agents or as contract employees. But I can assure you that the numbers run into the six figures as far as personnel are concerned and into the billions as far as cost is concerned. So don't ever feel that we're undermanned or underpriced in this effort. And further, I would emphasize to you that I have never yet heard the Congress reject any request in the intelligence field or cut down the amount of money that our Agency has asked for, or to my knowledge, other agencies have asked for - so it's not been a question of having been cut back by the Congress. Further, the Bureau of the Budget I think has been extremely liberal with us and has simply asked for ample justification but has never yet, except for very minute fractions, said, "You can't go up and ask for everything you've asked for." And,

in fact, to just add to that, almost every year the committees of the Congress, particularly House Appropriations, which is really the key committee, says, "Are you really getting enough?" and Mr. Dulles has almost invariably answered, "We're getting all the money we can spend and if we find we can spend more, we'll be back for more." So here is really a focus that you can put on the picture in that it's our responsibility to ask for more money or to get more people into the act, and we can't blame it on the Bureau of the Budget or the Congress that we're short-handed or that we don't have enough cash because that isn't -- that does not happen to be a fact. Secondly, the organization of the Intelligence Community of the United States. You may say, well, we're awful big and we're spending a lot of money - there must be an awful lot of duplication and must be quite wasteful. Well, I've never been in the industrial management side of private industry except very briefly before the war, but I've seen it sufficiently long to realize that every industry, every competent business, and particularly every profitable business, lays down a basic ground rule that every year they will increase their efficiency by a certain percentage. It will vary from industry to industry and business to business, but four, five, six, seven percent, or something like this, is in the general nature of the business. So when we look at the Intelligence Community we have to say, "Are we making improvements at that particular rate?" The answer to that, I would say, regretfully, is the categorical No, we're not improving that fast. Now, as far as duplication - yes, there is duplication and a lot of it can be eliminated. It's not of a major or disastrous nature but there's an awful lot of people doing identical work

around Washington or around CINCPAC in Honolulu, Commander in Chief of the Pacific, or around the European complex of military commands. It's particularly true in the field of requirements, in the field of publications, and in the field of low-level collection. It is not so true in some of the higher levels of intelligence work. In fact, the best coordinated part of the intelligence effort is at the highest level; and the least coordinated is at the lowest level. Now, if we eliminated this duplication - if we cut down on the number of publications - if we got the Army so it would stop writing political estimates of the situation in Europe, and stop writing the international Communist aspect of it - we would save some, but it's not in the nature of the figure that we're going to be talking about in a few minutes, about what we're really going to require in this area, nor is the duplication in the areas where most required. I would simply mention that our Agency alone, the CIA, puts out 191 different periodicals and publications - 191 different ones - not 191 issues a year. This is a total number of different publications and they range from daily to weeklys to monthlys to non-periodic issuances. If you multiply this by the rest of the Intelligence Community, and we're not a major producer - we have to take our hat off to the Air Force as being a slightly more major producer than we are. The Army is close to our size, the Navy much smaller; State even smaller than that - you can see the magnitude of what we publish in the Intelligence Community. I would submit here that this is an occupational illness, or perhaps it's an occupational necessity, but there is too much published and there is too much duplicative material published. Then we move over from the field

of production into the field of collection. How are we doing on collection? Well, we're not doing as well as we should. It's fairly obvious by current developments in the world that there are certain things moving faster and without our knowledge than should move. And this is not just true of the Soviet Union. I'm sure I don't have to describe to you some of the tremendous gaps in our information about the Soviet Union; gaps which the U2 for a period helped to fill, but which it never completely filled and never will fill, nor will any gadget or device fill some of the gaps about the Soviet Union. But we have gaps in other parts of the world. Communist China is becoming a more and more major factor in the world, even the Soviets recognize this, and I'm sure that they're not too happy about it either. There are at the undeveloped areas where our coverage is scanty in certain areas and these must be accelerated and filled. We're of course well covered in Western Europe, but even in Latin America there are gaps in coverage. Now, I think that a great deal of this coverage must be done by clandestine means or it must be done by better coordination between the Department of State and the CIA, and by a great augmentation of the military attache system, which I think is a vital part of our overt collection system and one that's been sadly neglected over the years by the Pentagon. You may require that Secretary of Defense, Johnson, practically cut it in half because he simply didn't think it was valuable. I don't believe he really looked into the facts. I don't think he was terribly interested in the facts. And this was a blow that the attache system took years to recover from. And even in the last administration there was a certain distain for the attache system and we had such peculiarities as

the air attache in Addis Ababa, also being accredited to the Sudan, except for the fact that every time he wanted to go from Addis Ababa to Khartoun he had to get permission of the Sudanese foreign office. This took a matter of a week to ten days so he really wasn't air attache to the Sudan - he was an occasional visitor. Until we have an attache system that can cover these countries, we're going to miss one of the major gaps in intelligence collection because every new country is going to have either a strong police force or a strong army as its major element for stability and the people that can best cover this overtly are the service attaches. We can cover some of it covertly, but we shouldn't try to cover what they will overtly.



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the keynote that I would like to make today as far as the last part of my discussion.

There's more than enough for everybody in the United States Government that wants to operate in the intelligence field to do. The Pentagon wants to triple the budgets of their military intelligence services. We can live with them, in fact, should encourage them to do this. I know that some of my colleagues were shocked when we said in the Joint Study Group Report that we should encourage, not discourage, the military intelligence services from clandestine collection, because I'm always looking forward to that day which might come where we'd get into hot war and find our military intelligence services without any officer personnel trained in clandestine collection, and then asking CIA to collect order of battle information in combat and if you can think of the worst use of our assets in wartime, I'm sure that I can't, because this is a terrible waste and OSS went through it. For OSS was asked for tactical order of battle information when they should have been operating on national level. So I would say first, there should be and probably will be a great expansion in the intelligence field. And I always consider intelligence as the very basic foundation for all work in which we might describe as the irregular activities field of the Government. If you don't have intelligence, then at least have the intelligence, or wisdom enough not to mount covert operations for paramilitary activities, because it's only going to kill off a lot of people. And if we kill off enough Cubans or other people, they certainly won't want to work with Americans in many parts of the world. This has a very discouraging effect on trying to encourage resistance; untrained revolt was one thing, but a Cuban revolt on our doorsteps is quite a different thing. So we must expand our intelligence base on which to mount.

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Covert action or paramilitary type actions or even should the decision be made to send in the irregular forces of our regular military establishments such as the Special Forces Groups. Then, secondly, it's fairly obvious that we've got to get into this cold war fight in much greater degree than we have in the past. I think we've got to worry a lot less in our organization about whether a leftist socialist group may prevail in a given country, and worry a great deal more about where the subversive Communist apparatus may be and who belongs to it and what they're doing. We've played the periphery long enough and we've tried to keep countries that are neutral and are going to darn well stay neutral, either in the neutral camp or even swing them over to the free world or the western block camp and I think we've got to step a lot of this and get much more specifically into the fight against the major targets. Now, you can do an analysis right across the board, geographical area by geographical area, of where our penetrations (and here I mean honest to God controlled penetrations) of the various Communist parties of the world may be. You take this analysis and put it alongside of an analysis of exactly what we know about the driving forces in each of these particular countries. You then compare all of this information with what we're estimating may happen in those particular countries; and then I would say you should project from that as to exactly the type of manpower and assets - Men, Money and Materiel - that the United States Government should plan to put into the clandestine effort to keep that country either neutral or keep it from going totally Communist. Now, as I say, I know of nowhere in the United States Intelligence Community that this is being done today and I think it must be done

and it must be done very, very soon - Not CIA-wise, but Intelligence Community-wise. And here I would simply urge us not to insist on sharing every one of these country teams, but on letting State share them if they wish to, or the Pentagon if it's a military situation. I think we would find, rather tragically, if we did this, several things. First, that the number of Communist party penetrations of a significant level (and I'm talking about the national party level) that we possess is far inadequate for what's required to know what's going to happen in a particular country. And you can expand this in great detail as to what we may know about what they're doing in the trade union field, what they're doing in the youth-student field, cultural field, teachers field - right across the board - because those those fronts are just as important as the party itself, and we simply must know in far greater detail, far greater depth than we have it today, of the subversive, the underground Communist apparatus in all these countries of the world, and watch the progress of the Soviets as they develop it in the new countries. I think I can use Somaliland as a good example here as to what we're not doing.

Now, Somaliland, as you know, became independent this last year and it grouped together two former colonies - the Italian mandate, the capitol of Mogadishu and the British mandate to the North. The French part of Somaliland did not come in at this time and we know it has an informal alliance with Ethiopia. In order to work together on the Somali desire to take over the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia, Somali became a country at a time when it had about four university graduates total in the entire area. Obviously, the education level was not equipped to run an independent country. The United States Government had in Somaliland at the time of

independence a Consulate General in Mogadishu, with a total of twelve officers. This was to cover an area of roughly the size of the state of Texas when the two countries got together. - Wild, nomadic, tribal - nobody today can tell you what's going on on the Somali-Ethiopia border, except those that are in there where the fighting goes on. The day that this country became independent the blocks started pouring in personnel and I don't know the exact figures this afternoon, but I would say at the moment they probably outnumber the United States personnel in that area by approximately twelve to one, at least. It may be closer to twenty or thirty or fifty to one, but they aren't going in with the handfuls. Furthermore, I would say that, following the brilliant example that the British set over centuries that the Reds undoubtedly have agents or provocateurs with most of the Somali tribes throughout the area, and that they know far better than we do what's going on in the country, and that their plan for the taking over of that particular country is pretty well laid down

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Now, these are tragic examples of the most powerful nation in the world, with the greatest material resources in history, just simply losing a cold war because of the lack of mobilization for this cold war. And I think that the thing that we can all hope and pray for is that the President, on the basis of what he said this afternoon, may well be planning to reorganize and mobilize what you might call the subversive arm of the United States Government, although I hope we won't call it in public this, in order to fight this cold war. We have been milk toasts, if you will, long enough about talking in public, about what's going on in the struggle with Communism. The time has come to stop calling this "peaceful coexistence", which simply plays into Khrushchev's hands and to start talking about the war that we are now fighting, because it is a war. . . and I think everybody knows that today. I think the time has come to speak out and say this. I admit I'm sort of lapping over into the field of policy here, but I think intelligence-wise part of our responsibility is to get this across - that we're either going to immobilize quickly or we might as well settle back into blessed isolation in the United States and hope that all the rockets will pass over and land in either the Atlantic or the Pacific.

And, finally, in this area of mobilization, we have been developing, as you know, in this organization a Contingency Task Force to be used in major areas of effort and I think this has proved to be exceedingly valuable in recent days, but once again I would say that it's on a much too

small a scale - that we would have to double or triple or even quadruple the size of this particular organization, recognizing full well that we might be subject to criticism because there will be times when it will not be utilized. But we have this magnificent base here; we may well be acquiring another one, and we certainly have the facilities to keep them occupied in developing and perfecting the techniques that obviously the Communists have developed and perfected already. And, further, I think that if what I'm talking about comes to pass, it probably will never be under-employed for some time to come. The ultimate objective, of course, that I'm talking about is an intelligence service that can help wage the war that is being waged today because I'm firmly convinced, as I said in the start, that the Communists will never want to employ their conventional military forces against our conventional military forces as long as they think that there is a possibility that they can win this war that they call "peaceful coexistence" through the subversive arm, as they're waging it today. And as of the afternoon of April 20, 1961, I see no reason to believe that the Communists aren't pretty certain of winning this war through subversive means.

Thank you very much. I'd be very happy to answer any questions that you might want to ask.

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)				
FROM: C/OS/TR			NO.	
			DATE 31 May 1961	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. DTR			[REDACTED]	<p>To 1: Attached are two copies of Mr. Kirkpatrick's address to OFC No. 21. Other copies are available if you desire them. If you have no objection, I plan to forward copies also to all School and Staff Chiefs of OTR under cover of the attached memorandum.</p> <div style="background-color: black; width: 100px; height: 30px; margin: 10px 0;"></div> <p>to 3.</p> <p>This is useful info for the Intl School and JSC</p> <div style="background-color: black; width: 100px; height: 30px; margin: 10px 0;"></div> <p>1-4: One copy retained for circulation in DIPS, after which we can forward it to C/OS/TR? Suggest copy to [REDACTED] 3u</p> <p>Please provide copies to 15 + [REDACTED] per above. n?</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em;">File</p>
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